Abstract-We discuss the tension between "what we can get" (identification) and "what we want" (parameters of interest) in models of policy choice (treatment assignment). Our nonstandard empirical object of interest is the ranking of counterfactual policies. Partial identification of treatment effects maps into a partial welfare ranking of treatment assignment policies. We characterize the identified ranking and show how the identifiability of the ranking depends on identifying assumptions, the feasible policy set, and distributional preferences. An application to the project STAR experiment illustrates this dependence. This paper connects the literatures on partial identification, robust statistics, and choice under Knightian uncertainty.
I. Introduction
M ETHODOLOGICAL difficulties in microeconometrics often arise from the tension between two conflicting objectives: the objective to use models based only on assumptions that seem credible a priori and the objective to estimate parameters that allow evaluating the impact of counterfactual policies. This paper contributes to exploring the frontier in the trade-off between these two objectives. We discuss identification of the ranking of counterfactual policies based on models without functional form assumptions.
Motivated by the twin objectives of credibility and policy relevance, the central contribution of this paper is the consideration of a nonstandard empirical object of interest, the ranking of counterfactual policies. 1 We develop a set of identification results that map distributions of observed data into partial orderings (identified rankings) of policies. A second contribution is that this paper draws connections, both conceptual and formal, between the literature on partial identification and the literature on ambiguity (Bewley, 2002; Stoye, 2011b) . There is a close relationship between the identified policy rankings considered here and Knightian uncertainty, as will be discussed below. A third contribution is that the discussion of nonlinear objectives in this paper extends the distributional decomposition literature, which considers distributional effects under conditional exogeneity (Firpo, Fortin, & Lemieux, 2009; Rothe, 2010) , by allowing for data with endogeneity.
The following framework is discussed in this paper. The policies h considered allocate a binary treatment D based on covariates X, h(X) = P(D = 1|X), as in Dehejia (2005) . The set of feasible policies is possibly subject to constraints. We are interested in identification approaches that partially identify conditional average treatment effects g(X) = E[Y 1 − Y 0 |X] or, more generally, the difference between the conditional distributions of the potential outcomes Y 1 , Y 0 . The planner's objective function takes the form φ( f ), where f is the distribution (density) of Y . This setup implies partial identification of the welfare ranking of policies h. 2 This paper discusses in particular the relationship among policy constraints, objective functions, and data requirements, which are such that it is possible to rank the feasible policy alternatives.
Consider as an example the project STAR experiment, which we discuss in sections II and VI. In this experiment, students were randomly assigned to small and large classrooms, but compliance was imperfect. We can infer bounds on conditional treatment effects from the project STAR data and use these to partially identify the welfare ranking of policies that affect class sizes for different groups of students. Whether a particular set of policies can be ranked in this setting indeed depends on identifying assumptions for treatment effects (monotonicity?), the set of policies considered (subject to a budget constraint?), and distributional preferences (maximize average test scores or test scores of students performing poorly?).
Starting in section III, we develop the theory of identification in this context. In addition to providing a geometric characterization of partial identification of welfare rankings, we develop a series of "possibility results" and "impossibility results." These results give necessary and sufficient conditions for either full identification of the welfare ranking of a given set of policies, full nonidentification, or partial identification. These results can provide guidance to applied researchers as to when and under what conditions their data contain worthwile information for policymakers. Additionally, our theoretical results allow us to make a number of interesting connections to other literatures, most notably the literature on ambiguity aversion and the literature on distributional decompositions.
In section III, we assume a linear objective function of the form φ = E [Y ] and provide geometric characterizations of the partial preference ranking of policies h. It is shown that two policies h a and h b can be ranked if the policy difference h ab = h a − h b lies in the dual cone or the polar cone of 112 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS the identified set for g; h a and h b cannot be ranked if h ab is orthogonal to some g in the identified set. Section III also gives necessary and sufficient conditions for sets of feasible policies that are subject to linear budget constraints to be completely ordered and for them to be completely unordered. It is shown that such sets of feasible policies can be completely ordered only if they are one-dimensional. Such sets are completely unordered if and only if we cannot preclude the possibility that treatment effects are proportional to the covariate-specific cost of treatment.
In section IV, we generalize the setup discussed in section III, allowing for general nonlinear but smooth objective functions φ( f ). Examples of such objective functions are quantiles, (quasi) Rawlsian welfare, as well as inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. This section first studies local policy changes. The effect of such local policy changes on social welfare φ( f ) can be characterized using the functional derivative ∂φ/∂f . The dual representation of ∂φ/∂f is the influence function IF(Y ). We find that the effect of local policy changes on welfare φ is partially identified, with finite bounds, if and only if φ has an influence function that is bounded on the support of Y , that is, if and only if φ is a "robust" statistic. Section IV then discusses how the effect of local policy changes on social welfare φ relates to welfare differences between policies in a neighborhood of a status quo policy. It is shown that under a condition of continuous differentiability on φ, both yield the same conclusions about the welfare ranking of such policies. Based on these results, section IV then generalizes the results of section III, giving necessary and sufficient conditions for identification of the ranking of policies.
In section V, we propose procedures for inference on the partially identified rankings discussed in sections III and IV. We first consider a given pair of policies and discuss tests of the hypotheses: (a) policy a is identified to be preferred to policy b, and (b) policy b is not identified to be preferred to policy a. The latter null hypothesis allows for a nonidentified welfare ranking. We then consider set inference on the set of policies identified to be preferred to a given policy h and on the set of policies for which h is not identified to be preferred to them. The latter set contains policies preferred to h as well as policies for which the welfare ranking is not identified. For either of these two cases, we propose procedures that guarantee uniform coverage of the set of interest.
The online appendixes (appendixes B-D) contain additional reviews and discussions. Appendix B provides a review of partial identification of treatment effects in instrumental variable and in panel data models (based on Manski, 2003, and Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, Hahn, et al., 2013) , appendix C reviews some concepts from functional analysis and differentiable geometry used in section IV, and appendix D discusses the relationship between this paper and the axiomatic decision theory literature, in particular, Bewley (2002) . Adapting results from this literature, we show that given a linear objective function φ = E[Y ], the identified preference order satisfies a property called independence.
Furthermore, any partial order satisfying independence is as if it did arise from some identified set for g.
A. Connections to the Literature
This paper contributes to two literatures in particular. First is the literature on partial identification of treatment effects, following Manski (2003) , and on treatment choice based on partially identified treatment effects (e.g., Manski, 2011, and Stoye, 2011a) . In contrast to those papers, this paper proposes to directly study identification of the welfare ranking of policies instead of treatment effects, which allows us to gain additional insights into the interaction of feasible policy sets, policy objectives, and data requirements. Second, in its discussion of nonlinear objective functions, this paper contributes to the literature on distributional decompositions following the seminal DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) work, building in particular on Firpo et al. (2009) . In contrast to this literature, which generally achieves point identification using a conditional independence assumption (see Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, & Melly (2013) and the review in Firpo et al. (2011) ), this paper allows for endogeneity of treatment relative to potential outcomes without imposing functional form assumptions. Analytically, easily tractable bounds are given for the effect of treatment assignment policies on statistics of the unconditional outcome distribution. From a practitioner's point of view, the results of this paper suggest new objects of interest, allow for easy analytical calculation of these objects, and provide criteria to check under what conditions a given data set is or is not informative about the ranking of feasible policies.
Several further strands of literature have been important in developing the ideas for this paper. The problem of optimal treatment assignment based on covariates has been analyzed by Manski (2004) , Dehejia (2005) , Hirano and Porter (2009 ), Chamberlain (2011 ), Stoye (2011a , and Bhattacharya and Dupas (2012) , among others. These papers focus on the decision-theoretic properties of policy choice based on finite samples from distributions point-identifying treatment effects. Our discussion differs from the one in papers such as Bhattacharya and Dupas (2012) in several respects: (a) We focus on the case of partial identification rather than assuming point identification based on a randomized experiment with perfect compliance. (b) We focus on welfare rankings of policies rather than optimal policy choice. Welfare rankings are in some sense an intermediate object between treatment effects and optimal treatment assignment policies. (c) We focus on issues of identification rather than on (finite sample) decision problems. (d) We allow for nonlinear objective functions of the form φ( f ) rather than requiring linearity.
Choice in the absence of subjective probability distributions (i.e., under ambiguity) has been studied in the decision theory literature since Knight (1921) . Formally related to this paper are, in particular, Bewley (2002) and Ryan (2009) , building on the classic Anscombe and Aumann IDENTIFICATION OF WELFARE RANKINGS 113 (1963) . In economic decision theory, ambiguity is primarily an ex post characterization of behavior satisfying certain axioms. In contrast, in the present context, it arises naturally from econometric models in the absence of functional form assumptions. Both stand in contrast to the issue of ambiguity in frequentist statistical decision theory, which does not impose prior distributions on model parameter values (see Stoye, 2011b , and the discussion in supplementary appendix D).
Partial identification of treatment effects has been analyzed in the pioneering work of Manski. The results in this paper apply to any approach yielding partial identification of treatment effects. Two identification approaches are discussed in more detail in supplementary appendix B: nonparametric instrumental variables (see Manski, 2003) and panel data with an assumption about marginal stationarity of unobserved heterogenity (see Chernozhukov, FernandezVal, Hahn, et al. 2013) . The trade-off between credibility and relevance mentioned in the beginning has been central in the debates between proponents of causal and those of structural approaches (Deaton, 2010; Imbens, 2010; Angrist & Pischke, 2010; Nevo & Whinston, 2010) . In these debates, proponents of causal approaches have emphasized the necessity of credible identification, and proponents of structural approaches have emphasized the importance of estimating parameters that allow an evaluation counterfactual policies. The relationship between relevant policy sets and parameters of interest has been considered by Chetty (2009) and Graham, Imbens, and Ridder (2008) . Like this paper, both of these make arguments implying that evaluation of the relative merits of different policies requires knowledge of only some parameters, not full knowledge of the underlying structural relationships. Sen (1995) also raises a related point, arguing that even if there is disagreement over the exact trade-offs among policy objectives, social consensus might be achieved over the ranking of policy alternatives.
II. A Motivating Example
Consider the following scenario. In a policy experiment, children were randomly allocated to small or large classes. Compliance with treatment assignment was incomplete, in particular because a number of students assigned to large classes switched to small classes. We furthermore observe a number of pretreatment characteristics of all children in the participating schools, most notably whether they received free lunch, an indicator of poverty. This scenario in fact describes exactly what happened in the project STAR experiment, to which we return in section VI.
Suppose now that a policymaker wishes to evaluate the relative merits of various alternative policies regarding class sizes. In order to do so, she first has to answer several questions:
1. What assumptions is she willing to impose on the data-generating process-for instance, randomness of treatment assignment, monotonicity of treatment take-up in assignment, monotonicity of outcomes in treatment? 2. What is the objective function she wishes to maximize-for instance test scores in math or reading or other measurable outcomes-and given the outcome variable of interest, average outcomes, or the outcomes of those doing poorly, or the outcomes of those doing well already? Some weighted average of outcomes? 3. What policy alternatives is she considering? Hiring more teachers so as to reduce class-sizes for everyone? Or is she subject to a budget constraint and can only redistribute across schools or across studentsfor instance, decreasing class sizes for students on free lunch while increasing class sizes for others?
The answers to all these questions determine whether she will be able to rank the policy alternatives under consideration. The following scenarios are conceivable and in fact describe exactly what we find in our empirical application as discussed in section VI:
1. Assuming only randomness of treatment assignment, alternative policies cannot be ranked. This is due to the partial identification resulting from noncompliance. If additional monotonicity assumptions are imposed, however, then some alternatives can be ranked. 2. If her goal is to maximize the outcomes of good students, that is, increase the upper quantiles of the test score distribution, then the impact of redistributive policies is ambiguous. If her goal is to increase the test scores of poorly performing students, however, then redistributing teachers to students receiving free lunch is unambiguously positive. 3. If the policy alternative under consideration is a class size reduction for all students, then the impact of this alternative is unambiguously positive even when the goal is to maximize the upper quantiles of the score distribution. If the policy alternative under consideration is redistribution, however, the impact of this alternative might be ambiguous.
Before we get to a more detailed discussion of the project STAR data, we will discuss a number of theoretical questions. The next section focuses on the case where the objective function is given by the average E[Y ] of an observed outcome Y . 3 In this setting, we formally discuss the mapping from bounds on conditional treatment effects (e.g., class size effects for poor and nonpoor students) to a partial ranking of policies (e.g., class size reduction for all, redistribution across students). As it turns out, there 114 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS is a nice geometric interpretation of this mapping, which also opens a tight connection between our setting and the decision-theoretic literature on ambiguity aversion, as discussed in online appendix D. Section IV generalizes to nonlinear objective functions of the form φ( f ), and section V discusses inference focusing on the baseline case of a nonlinear objective function.
III. Welfare Ranking of Policies
Throughout this paper, the following setup is considered. The outcome of interest, Y , is generated by a structural relationship of the form Y = m (X, D, ) , where the treatment D is binary, D ∈ {0, 1}. The support of covariates X and unobservables is left unrestricted. We will denote potential outcomes by
The counterfactual treatment assignment policies considered randomly assign units characterized by X to treatment D = 1 with probability h(X):
The policies h considered include as a special case deterministic policies of the form h(X) ∈ {0, 1}, where
We briefly discuss the assumptions that counterfactual treatment assignment is possibly randomized as well as exogenous. Allowing for randomized policies h convexifies the space of policies and has a similar role to the consideration of randomized tests in standard discussions of testing. This convexification allows constraints to be satisfied with equality and leads to a more elegant treatment, even though in some cases, the optimal policy does not involve randomization. All results immediately translate to the set of deterministic policies, since these are contained in the set of randomized policies.
The assumption of exogenous treatment assignment is more restrictive, in particular, since we will consider identification based on data in which compliance to an experimental assignment is incomplete. 4 How reasonable this assumption is will depend on context; arguably there are many cases in which compliance is more easily guaranteed in the context of a universally implemented policy h than in a local experiment where there are more outside options for participants.
In the context of our motivating example, I believe that this assumption makes sense. In the project STAR experiment, each participating school had both large and small classes, making it fairly easy for parents to transfer their child to a class of different size within the school. Under a counterfactual policy, however, class sizes are most likely determined at the level of schools or even school districts. As a consequence, switching to a class of different size would require switching to a school with different class sizes, possibly far away, making noncompliance much more costly.
Considering the effect of policies h rather than simple conditional average treatment effects allows us in particular to consider constrained policy sets, for instance, sets subject to budget constraints or political economy constraints. In such constrained sets, there is no trivial mapping from the identified sign of conditional average treatment effects to policy rankings or optimal policy.
In this section we maintain the additional assumption of a linear objective function: This framework is similar to the ones studied by Manski (2004), Dehejia (2005) , Bhattacharya and Dupas (2012) , and others. Many setups of interest can be subsumed under this framework, where g might reflect a technological or a behavioral relationship. Decision problems that fit into this framework include (a) the assignment of income support programs by a policymaker interested in labor market outcomes, as in Dehejia (2005); (b) the allocation of indivisible capital goods to units of production by profit-maximizing firm owners; (c) the assignment of a medical treatment by doctors maximizing some health outcomes of their patients; (d) the decision of whether to attend college by students' taking into account the economic returns (among other factors), as in Card (2001); or (e) the assignment of students to integrated or segregated classes by an educational policymaker interested in maximizing average rescaled test scores, as in Graham et al. (2008) . 5 In all of these applications, we might expect the available data to only partially identify average treatment effects, absent functional form assumptions.
An important limitation of the setup considered here is that it does not allow for incentive compatibility constraints on feasible policy sets. Incentive compatibility introduces a particular form of nonseparability of constraints across treatment units, which complicates the analysis yet is central for many interesting optimal policy problems in mechanism design and optimal taxation, such as those discussed in Chetty (2009) . I analyze optimal policy under such constraints in a related paper (Kasy, 2014a) .
A. Preliminaries
Partial identification of the potential outcome distributions P(Y d |X) for d = 0, 1 implies a partial ordering of the set of policies h. Consider a policy h a , where
, and D b similarly for a policy h b . Denote the difference of the probability of assignment to treatment between these two policies by h ab := h a − h b and let the difference in social welfare achieved by the two policies be given by
where g(X) is the conditional average treatment effect defined as
Equation (1) given X, which follows from the definition of the set of policies h we consider. This paper will use g throughout to denote conditional average treatment effects.
We consider in this section the space of bounded measurable functions of X, equipped with the inner product
and with the norm ||g|| = √
In this notation, we can rewrite equation (1) as
Define the set of policies
5 Bhattacharya (2009) condered a similar problem.
The corresponding set of policy differences,
, is the unit ball of X-measurable functions with respect to the sup norm.
Thus far, we have made no assumption about the available data. In the setup considered here, welfare rankings are a function of the conditional average treatment effects g. We will assume availability of a general identified set for g, denoted G . As a special case, we will repeatedly consider rectangular sets G , as in the following assumption:
Assumption 2 (rectangular identified set for g). The identified set G for g is rectangular, that is, G is of the form
Such rectangular identified sets arise, for instance, in nonparametric instrumental variables and panel data models in the absence of functional form assumptions, as follows from the results of Manski (2003) and Chernozhukov, FernandezVal, Hahn, et al. (2013) . (See online appendix B.1 and B.2 for a review and discussion). 6 Note that we will mainly invoke this assumption for illustration and in order to obtain more explicit expressions. None of our main results rely on this assumption; it is in particular not invoked in the statement of propositions 1, 3, and 4 in this section or in the statement of theorem 1, proposition 6, and proposition 7 in section IV. Rectangular identified sets are obtained if no restrictions across covariate values are imposed on treatment effects. A leading case where the identified set would not be rectangular would be an assumption of monotonicity of conditional average treatment effects g(x) in x or some component of x.
The identified set for φ ab is given by
Two policies h a , h b are strictly ordered if and only if
Definition 1 (welfare ranking and identified welfare ranking of policies). Given conditional average treatment effects g(X), the welfare ranking between policies is given by
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Given an identified set G for conditional average treatment effects g, the identified welfare ranking between policies is
given by
Equation (7) defines a complete order of the set of policies H . The relation G is a partial order of H . 7 We have 
B. Geometric Interpretation
The relationship between the set G and the preference ordering G can be given a useful geometric interpretation. The dual cone of a set G is defined as the set 8
This is the set of all h such that the angle between h and g is no more than 90 degress for all g in G . Equivalently, it is the intersection over all g ∈ G of the half-spaces {h : h, g ≥ 0}.
The polar cone is given by
This is the set of all h such that the angle between h and g is at least 90 degress for all g in G . We have, by definition, that
Let K denote the closure of a set K with respect to the norm ||.||, and K o the interior of K . 
where g ⊥ = {h : h, g = 0} is the orthocomplement of g. Mas-Colell et al., 1995) . 8 See, for instance, Bertsekas, Nedić, and Ozdaglar (2003) . The proof of this proposition, and all further proofs, can be found in appendix A. The assumption 0 / ∈ G simply rules out the trivial case where the data are uninformative about the ranking of any pair of policies. The equality in equation (13) requires the existence of a separating hyperplane between 0 and G , which follows from the existence of argmin g∈G ||g||. This always holds for rectangular G , as in assumption 2, and if X has finite support. For rectangular G , an element of argmin g∈G ||g||, is given by
The existence of such a separating hyperplane more generally follows from the Hahn-Banach theorem if G o is not empty.
Define dH max to be the maximal set of policy differences Figure 1 illustrates proposition 1 for the case where X has two points of support. The identified region G for g(.) is rectangular, as in assumption 2. The maximal set of policy differences corresponding to weakly ordered policy pairs, dH max , is given by the intersection of the set of feasible policy differences (the square in the center), with the dual cone and the polar cone of G . The dual cone is the set in the upper-right part of the figure; it contains all vectors that have an angle of 90 degrees or less with all vectors in G . The polar cone is the set in the lower-left part of the figure; it contains all vectors that have an angle of 90 degrees or more with all vectors in G . The set of policy differences that cannot be strictly ranked is the set of vectors that are orthogonal to some element of G .
Proposition 1 characterizes the set of all policy pairs ordered by G . We are now going to give a sufficient condition for a pair of policies h a , h b to be ordered, that is, for identification of sign(φ ab ). Assume the identification region G is rectangular, and let the function w describe the width of the identified set for g(X), w(X) = g(X) − g(X). Online appendixes B.1 and B.2 give expressions for w that have the interesting feature that they do not depend on the distribution of Y but are solely a function of the strength of the instrument (in appendix B.1), or the variability of treatment within cross-sectional units over time (in appendix B.2). 
Proposition 2 (sufficient condition). Suppose assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, if
where
Note that the left-hand side of inequality (14) is the width of the identified set (interval) for φ ab , while the right-hand side is equal to |φ ab |. This proposition can also be interpreted by considering the set
C. Restricted Policy Sets
We might hope that some restricted sets of policies are totally ordered by G even if the full set H is not. Policy sets that lie in affine subspaces intersected with H are a particularly interesting set of restrictions. Such restrictions might arise, for instance, as a consequence of linear budget constraints of the form E[h(X)c(X)] = h, c = C, where c(X) is the (average) cost of treatment for units characterized by X.
Assumption 3 (affine restrictions on policy set). The set of feasible policies is given by
The following proposition characterizes when policy sets subject to affine restrictions are totally ordered. Proposition 3 requires the assumption that G has nonempty interior G o . In the case of rectangular G , this is equivalent to assuming that g(x) is not point identified for any x. If g(x ) were point identified for some x , while g(x) is not point identified for all x = x , then there might be two-dimensional feasible sets H which are totally ordered.
An important example of one-dimensional policy spaces arises if h is restricted to be constant in X or, more generally, if h has to be equal to 0 on a subset of X and constant on the rest of its support. Such restrictions might follow, for instance, if there is a nondiscrimination requirement that all individuals be treated equally or with equal probability. Another example would be the case of binary X, as in figure  1 , and a policy space subject to a linear budget constraint.
Proposition 3 characterizes when sets subject to affine restrictions are totally ordered. The following proposition characterizes the opposite extreme: sets subject to linear budget constraints that cannot be ordered at all. 
As a special case of proposition 4, consider the case of one linear budget constraint, k = 1. In that case, proposition 4 tells us that the data are completely uninformative about the ranking of policies if and only if they are consistent with the hypothesis that treatment effects g are proportional to treatment costs c 1 . If two policies h a , h b satisfy such a linear budget constraint, then the policy difference h ab lies in the hyperplane c ⊥ 1 . If two policies can be ordered, then their difference has to be in the dual cone of G , or its negative. Proposition 4 reflects the fact that the intersection of the hyperplane c ⊥ with the dual cone of G is empty if and only if λc ∈ G for some λ.
An interesting example where such a linear budget constraint arises is in the context of reallocations of individuals across groups, which might affect outcome distributions in the presence of social externalities (see Graham et al., 2008) . In such a context, the feasible reallocations have to leave the population distribution of individual characteristics constant.
Note that in this section, we have restricted our attention to equality constraints of the form h, c i = C i rather than inequality constraints of the form h, c i ≤ C i . Inequality constraints do not change any qualitative statements about the identifiability of welfare rankings relative to the unconstrained case. To see this, consider a set H subject to inequality constraints that contains an open ball. Such an An important example of a status quo policy h * , as in assumption 4, would be the zerotreatment policy h * = 0. In that case, the potential outcome distribution f 0 is known in principle and any nonidentification of treatment effects arises from ignorance about f 1 . The role of the assumption that the baseline is known is to allow for a local linearization of the nonlinear objective function φ around the baseline. The identification results derived for the linear case then translate to the nonlinear one by using this local linearization. A discrete support of X is assumed to streamline the exposition and avoid introducing additional technical complications.
There are many interesting examples of nonlinear objective functions φ. A social planner might care about the following approximation to the Rawlsian maximin objective,
where w(τ) are known welfare weights, the mass of which is concentrated on τ close to 0, and F −1 (τ) is the τth quantile of the distribution corresponding to f . Alternatively, the planner might care about inequality as measured by (1 minus) the Gini coefficient, which can be written as
Our goal is to give analytical characterizations of the identified welfare ranking and generalize the results of section III to this nonlinear setup. In order to achieve this goal, we will first consider a linearized version of the problem, replacing φ by a first-order approximation, which gives the welfare ranking of local policy changes. It will then be shown that all the qualitative conclusions drawn for the linearized problem carry over to the original problem, in a neighborhood of the status quo policy and under a condition of continuous differentiability on φ.
These results are easily applied in practice by replacing the outcome Y by the influence function IF(Y ; f * ) of φ, where the influence function is evaluated at the status quo outcome distribution f * . For this modified problem, all the previous arguments apply, for instance, those concerning the identified set for treatment effects on welfare and those representing the upper contour set of a given policy as the dual cone of this identified set.
The approach taken here can be understood as a generalization of approaches taken in the recent distributional decomposition literature, in particular, Firpo et al. (2009) . Firpo et al. (2009) suggest replacing Y by IF(Y ) in OaxacaBlinder-type decompositions, thus generalizing such decompositions to general statistics of the outcome distribution, while at the same time preserving the advantages of a linear structure. In contrast to the decomposition literature, which generally assumes conditional independence of potential outcomes from treatment and thus achieves point identification of policy effects (see the review in Firpo et al., 2011) , the results presented here are concerned with the implications of endogeneity, absent functional form assumptions, for identification of policy effects on φ.
Online appendix C reviews some mathematical preliminaries that are crucial for a concise statement of the following results. The rest of this section is structured as follows. Section IVA characterizes the effects of local policy changes on social welfare φ and the identified set for these effects. Section IVB then maps the identified set for these effects into an identified welfare ranking of local policy changes. It is shown that under certain conditions, the welfare ranking of local policy changes is the same as the welfare ranking of corresponding pairs of policies in a neighborhood of the status quo policy. Section IVC finally uses these results in order to generalize the qualitative characterizations derived in section III to the nonlinear case.
A. Effect of Local Policy Changes
We now characterize the identified set for the effect of local policy changes on social welfare φ. Our characterizations crucially depend on the differentiability of φ. We need to impose one of the following forms of differentiability, which are increasingly restrictive.
Assumption 5 (differentiability of φ).
a. The function φ is Fréchet differentiable at f * for the
b. The function φ is Fréchet differentiable at f * for the L 1 norm f = |f |dμ. c. The function φ is continuously Fréchet differentiable in a neighborhood of f * for the L 1 norm f = |f |dμ.
In online appendix C, we discuss these forms of differentiability in greater detail.
We can write the effect of a local policy change in various ways, as demonstrated by the following lemma. First, we can approximate the nonlinear functional φ by the expectation
for distributions close to the densityf , where IF is the so-called influence function. This approximation by the expectation of the influence function is valid under L p differentiability for any p. This linearization of φ then leads to a representation of the effect of local policy changes that is reminiscent of our previous representation of the effect of a discrete policy change h ab ,
where g φ is the conditional average treatment effect of treatment D on the influence function IF. Compare this to our previous representation,
where g is the conditional average treatment effect of D on Y . 
Lemma 1 (dual representations). Suppose assumptions 4 and 5a hold. Consider the derivative at 0 with respect to θ of φ( f (h(θ))), where h(.) is a family of policies as in definition 5, and f (h) is the outcome distribution induced by h. Denotě f = f (h(0)). Then there are functions IF( y;f ), g f ( y|x), and g φ (x;f ), independent of the family h, such that the derivatives with respect to θ of φ and f are given by
If we denote g
Note also how, in equation (19), g φ takes the role that g had in the linear case discussed in section III.
Examples
Let φ = E[Y ] = y f ( y)dμ( y). Then
HereĚ denotes the expectation with respect to the distributionf . Note that in contrast to the first example, the directional derivative of the variance does depend on the status quo distribution viaĚ [Y ] . 3. Let φ be the τth quantile of Y , given by φ = F −1 (τ) = inf{y : F( y) ≥ τ}. 10 By the implicit function theorem, if Y is continuously distributed so that F is differentiable, ∂φ/∂θ = −F θ (φ)/F y (φ), where F y = f is the density of y. Thus, denotingφ = φ(f ),
The examples of (quasi) Rawlsian welfare, and the Gini coefficient can be analyzed similarly. For ease of exposition, we stick to the simpler examples of mean, variance, and quantiles throughout.
Rectangular identified sets.
So far, we have not specified to what extent the conditional potential outcome distributions are identified. The following assumption is the natural generalization of assumption 2, which stated that the identified set for g is rectangular. Lemmas 3 and 5 in online appendix B show that assumption 6 holds in nonparametric instrumental variables and panel data setups. We should 9 Note that in order to keep notation simple, but contrary to statistical convention, we are not normalizing influence functions to have mean 0 in the examples. This is justified by the fact that g f (.|x)dμ and f θ dμ integrate to 0.
10 An axiomatic justification of preferences for maximizing a particular quantile was provided by Rostek (2010) ; Manski (1988) also considered such preferences.
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emphasize again that rectangular identified sets are discussed here only because they are very common, not because they are required for any of our main results.
Assumption 6 (rectangular identified set for g f ). The identified set
, is rectangular over X and has the form
and γ 0 (x) are known and f 1 (.|x, cf ), f 0 (.|x, cf ) are counterfactual outcome densities (for some subpopulation) ranging over the set of probability densities relative to μ on the support of Y .
Lemma 1 allows constructing a mapping from the identified set for g
gives the average effect of treatment on welfare φ conditional on X, at the status quo distribution f * . The mapping from g f to g φ is given by g
dμ( y). The mapping of identified sets is characterized in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 (bounds on local policy effects and robustness). Suppose assumptions 4, 5a, and 6 hold. Then the identified set for g φ is rectangular, if f * (φ * ) > 0. Quantiles thus have bounded influence functions even in the absence of a priori restrictions on the counterfactual outcome distribution; they are "robust." As a consequence, we get bounded confidence sets for the effect of policy changes on unconditional quantiles of the outcome distribution even for unbounded outcomes.
Proposition 5 characterizes the identified set for G φ (h * ). More generally we will be interested in the set G φ (h). This set maps into the identified set for the effect of local policy changes h θ , relative to a given policy h, on social welfare φ.
The simple characterization of G φ (h * ) does not hold for general h because of the double dependence of g φ on g f : through the effect of the policy changes on the distribution of Y and through the distribution f at which IF( y; f ) is evaluated. The only exception to this double dependence is the status quo assignment policy h * , for which we have
B. Ranking Policies in a Neighborhood of the Status Quo
Section IVA characterized the effect of local policy changes h θ on social welfare φ and the identified set for this effect, h θ , G φ . This section relates the difference in welfare for different policies to its first-order approximation, given by the welfare impact of local policy changes. It will be shown that under assumption 5c, the welfare ranking of local policy changes is the same as the welfare ranking of corresponding pairs of policies in a neighborhood of the status quo policy. In order to formally state this and further claims, the following two definitions are useful.
where in the latter definition, h(θ) is such that ∂h/∂θ(0) = h θ and h(0) = h. The difference Δφ(h ab ; h) gives the lower bound of the identified set for the welfare difference between h + h ab and h. The differential dφ(h θ ; h) gives the lower bound of the identified set for the marginal welfare effect of a change in the direction of h θ , starting from h. Under assumption 5a, as in lemma 1, we can rewrite dφ(h θ ; h) as
and thus the local upper contour set of h is given by 12
Analogously, we can define the upper contour set of h as the set of policies
Proposition 5 gave an intuitive and tractable characterization of the set G φ (h * ), which maps into a characterization of the set TU(h * ), the set of welfare increasing local policy changes starting from h * . Ultimately, however, we are interested in welfare differences between policies h a and h b , for which Δφ(h ab ; h b ) provides the identified lower bound. The following theorem relates the two. This theorem states that the welfare ranking of two policies of difference proportional to h θ corresponds to the sign of the welfare effect of the local policy change h θ , at least if the policies compared are close to the baseline h * .
Theorem 1 (the welfare ranking of local policy changes and of policy differences). Suppose assumptions 4 and 5c hold. Let h θ be such that dφ(h θ ; h * ) > 0. Then there exists a δ such that Δφ(γ · h θ ; h) > 0 for all h such that h − h * ≤ δ and all 0 < γ ≤ δ.
Examples
We have already discussed L 1 differentiability-boundedness of the influence function. It remains to check continuity of the mapping f → IF(.; f ) with respect to the L 1 norm for f and the L ∞ norm for IF. 5c is violated. This is because the numerator of IF is continuous as a mapping from f to 1( y ≤ φ( f )). The denominator does not affect the relative welfare effect of local policy changes, only their scale.
C. Generalization of Results from the Linear Case
We are now ready to generalize to the nonlinear case the sufficient and necessary conditions for complete identification and complete nonidentification of preferences given in propositions 3 and 4. The natural generalization of assumption 3, which imposed linear constraints on the feasible policy set, in a nonlinear context is as follows:
Assumption 7 (nonlinear constraints). The set of feasible policies is given by
Such nonlinear constraints might arise, for instance, if there was an increasing marginal cost of increasing the treatment probability h for a given subgroup of the population. Under assumption 7, the tangent space at the status quo policy h * is given by
that is, T h * H is subject to k linear constraints. Propositions 3 and 4 generalize as follows:
Proposition 6 (restricted policy sets such that T h * H is totally ordered). Suppose assumptions 4, 5a, and 7 hold, and assume that G φ has nonempty interior
Proposition 7 (restricted policy sets such that T h * H is completely unordered). Suppose assumptions 4, 5a, and 7 hold, and assume that G φ is convex and G φ has nonempty interior G φ o . Then the following two statements are equivalent:
How do these two results relate to the identification of the welfare ranking of policies? The following theorem shows that locally full identification, partial identification, or full nonidentification of the welfare ranking of local policy changes imply the same for identification of the ranking of policies in a neighborhood of the status quo.
Theorem 2. Suppose assumptions 4, 5c, and 7 hold and suppose G φ is bounded. Then there is a neighborhood N of h
* in H such that, for all h ∈ N:
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iii. If G φ has nonempty interior G φ o and the welfare ranking on T h H is fully identified, then so is the ranking of N.
Theorems 1 and 2 show that the qualitative conclusions we obtain from the linearized objective function are valid for our original objective function φ in some-possibly smallneighborhood. For large discrete policy changes (policy changes that affect a large fraction of the population) or highly nonlinear functionals, we might be worried that our qualitative conclusions are affected by using a linear approximation to the objective function. In that case, our theoretical results are best interpreted again as possibility or impossibility results, providing conditions when alternative policies can be completely ranked, not ranked at all, or partially ranked. In such a setting, exact bounds on welfare effects and the corresponding welfare ranking can still be obtained in many cases by imputing worst-case and best-case counterfactual outcomes to everybody in the population. Such an approach does require monotonicity conditions that allow us to know which the worst-case and best-case outcomes would be, and thus necessarily has to be specific to the chosen objective function φ.
When should we be worried whether our theoretical results using first-order approximations yield valid conclusions for discrete, rather than marginal, policy changes? The question is somewhat ill posed. The theoretical results in this section concern the existence of policies that can be ranked and of policies that cannot be ranked. Whether such policies exist in a neighborhood of the status quo is not a function of the magnitude of a given policy change that we might be interested in.
How about the validity of the qualitative conclusions drawn for a specific policy change? The answer depends on the specific objective under consideration. In the application in the next section, we focus on quantiles. The quantiles of a distribution are increased by a policy change if and only if the cumulative distribution function at the corresponding values is decreased. But the cumulative distribution function, which can be written in the form
, is in fact a linear object. This remarkably implies that the conclusions drawn regarding the sign of the effect of policy changes are always the same based on a linear approximation for quantiles as for the original, nonlinear objective.
For general objectives φ, whether a linearization yields valid answers for a given policy change depends on the magnitude of the subpopulation for which the policy is changed. Arguably in many cases, the population of ultimate interest, say, all the schoolchildren in the United States, is much larger than the subpopulation for which a policy is changed, say, half the children in eighty schools in Tennessee. In such a setting, there seems little reason to worry about higherorder properties of the objective function invalidating any qualitative conclusions.
First-order approximations such as the ones we employ are prominently used in many areas of econometrics. They are a key ingredient to the standard asymptotic theory of m-estimators, the delta method, semiparametric efficiency theory, and so on (van der Vaart, 2000). They also underlie part of the distributional decomposition literature, of which this section could be understood to be an extension to the partially identified case. They finally-and importantly for our setting-underlie much of the normative public finance literature, where social welfare is approximated by a weighted average of individual welfare (see Mirrlees, 1971; Saez & Stantcheva, 2013 ; the discussion in section 4 of Kasy (2014c) ). Such a linearization of social welfare is in fact more than we need for our results, since it requires differentiable influence functions (Kasy, 2014c) .
V. Inference on Partially Identified Welfare Rankings
In sections III and IV, we discussed partial identification of the welfare ranking of treatment-assignment policies based on partial identification of treatment effects. In this section, we propose procedures for inference on these partially identified rankings. We first consider a given pair of policies h a , h b , and discuss tests of the hypotheses (a) h
The latter null hypothesis allows for a nonidentified welfare ranking.
We then consider set inference on the set of policies identified to be preferred to a given policy h and on the set of policies for which h is not identified to be preferred to them. The latter set contains policies preferred to h as well as policies for which the welfare ranking is not identified. For either of these two cases, we propose procedures that guarantee uniform coverage of the set of interest.
Throughout this section, we consider the following setup:
• X has finite support (x 0 , . . . , x n ).
• The objective function φ is linear,
• An asymptotically normal estimator
of the bounds defining G is available, such that
• There is a consistent estimator Σ of Σ.
Requiring X to be discrete allows us to sidestep a number of technical issues that would arise in the continuous case. Requiring asymptotically normal estimators of bounds is somewhat restrictive. It is, however, easily satisfied for the identification approaches reviewed in online appendix B, where sample analogs of the bounds in equation (40) (instrumental variables) and equation (41) 
It follows from our assumptions and Slutsky's theorem that
B. Uniform Confidence Sets
Instead of just considering the relative social welfare achievable by two given policies h a and h b , we might be interested in the set of all policies h a that can be identified to be preferred to a given h b or, equivalently, the set of all h ab such that h ab , g ≥ 0 for all g ∈ G . 13 This set is the dual cone G * of G . We might also be interested in the set of all policies h a such that h b cannot be identified to be preferred to h a or,
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equivalently, the set of all h ab such that not h ab , g ≤ 0 for all g ∈ G . This set is the complement of the polar cone G × of G . We now construct set estimators H 1 and H 2 containing these two sets with prespecified asymptotic probability 1−α. To do so, note first the following:
1. The mapping from G to its dual cone G * is monotonically decreasing in the sense that
2. The same holds for the polar cone
2 , where c denotes complements.
Suppose we have set estimators G 1 and G 2 that satisfy that
Then, using set monotonicity of the mapping to dual or polar cones, we get
It remains to construct set estimators G 1 and G 2 with the desired coverage properties. Let us first consider G 2 . We propose an estimator G 2 that takes the estimated bounds g, g and expands them outward using factors σ(x) × δ and σ(x) × δ, which are chosen based on Σ in such a way to guarantee the required asymptotic coverage. That is, we consider estimators G 2 of the form 14
where δ is chosen to guarantee the required coverage. The factors σ(x) and σ(x) are the asymptotic standard deviations of g (x), g(x) , that is, the square roots of the appropriate diagonal elements of Σ.
In this setting, δ depends on only the covariance matrix Σ and can be easily calculated numerically to solve
for
The relevant probability in this expression can be evaluated using Monte Carlo draws. As the "critical value" δ is onedimensional and the relevant probability is monotonic in δ, it is straightforward to solve for δ(Σ) using, for instance, a grid search procedure. Using the consistent variance estimator Σ, define the plug-in estimator
where σ(x), σ(x) are the estimates of σ(x) and σ(x) implied by Σ. This estimator has the desired asymptotic coverage:
Define analogously
If lower and upper bounds for one of the intervals defining G 1 cross, G 1 is understood to be the empty set. For this definition, we get
Note that various alternative estimators G 1 and G 2 with the desired coverage properties are easily constructed. In particular, factors of proportionality other than σ(x), σ(x) could be used to scale the expansion and shrinkage terms δ, . Any choice that is based on Σ alone (i.e., not based on the estimated bounds g, g) might be used to construct sets with the desired coverage. Alternative choices might be useful, in particular, if power against particular alternatives is a concern.
VI. Application to Data from the Project STAR Experiment
In this section, the theoretical results developed in this paper are applied to data from the famous project STAR experiment. Data from this experiment have been used by many contributions to the economics of education literature, such as Krueger (1999) and Graham et al. (2008) ; background information on the experiment can be found in Boyd-Zaharias et al. (2007) . The following discussion builds in particular on Krueger (1999) .
The project STAR experiment, Student/Teacher Achievement Ratio, was conducted in Tennessee beginning in 1985. In this experiment, kindergarten students and teachers were randomly assigned to one of three groups beginning in the 1985-1986 school year: small classes (13 to 17 students per teacher), regular-size classes (22 to 25 students), and regular classes with a full-time teacher aide. Students were supposed to remain in the same class type for four years. The data set covers students from eighty schools. Each participating school was required to have at least one of each class type, and random assignment took place within schools. Kindergarten attendance was not mandatory in Tennessee during this time. Students entering a participating school in grade 1 or later were randomly assigned to a class on entry. Compliance with experimental assignment was incomplete, as a number of students switched between small and regular classes between grades. Furthermore, a sizable number of students are missing from the data set in years following the initial random assignment.
A number of features of this experiment make it an interesting application for the theoretical results of this paper. First, compliance to experimental assignment was large but incomplete. This implies that conditional average treatment effects are only bound-identified, but the bounds are not too wide so as to be completely uninformative. Second, there appears to be heterogeneity in treatment effects (Krueger, 1999) . This heterogeneity implies that reallocations subject to a budget constraint might be potentially welfare improving. Third, there might be disagreement about the objective function, the credibility of various identifying assumptions, and the budget constraint. We demonstrate how the identification of policy rankings depends on the interaction of these three.
For our analysis, we restrict attention to the sample of students who are observed in grades 1 through 3. Table 1 shows a number of summary statistics for this sample. Here "poor" equals 1 for students receiving a free lunch in the first year they are observed in the sample. We pool classes with and without an aide and study only the effect of class size. Assigned treatment Z equals 1 for students assigned to a small class on first entering a project STAR school. The realized treatment variable D equals 1 for students who remained in a small class throughout the study period, except for at most one year. The fact that observations are not balanced across values of Z is not indicative of a violation of This table shows the joint distribution of assigned treatment Z and realized treatment D in our sample. Assigned treatment equals 1 if students were assigned to a small class on first entering a project STAR school, and realized treatment equals 1 for students who remained in a small class throughout the study period, except for at most one year. randomization since randomization took place on the school level. Table 2 shows the joint distribution of assigned and realized class size. It can be seen from this table that noncompliance with treatment assignment is an issue. Realized treatment is not equal to assigned treatment for about 7% of students.
Given random assignment of initial class type, a natural assumption in this setting is conditional instrument exogeneity, Z ⊥ (Y 0 , Y 1 )|X, for potential test scores Y 0 , Y 1 that a student would have achieved under a counterfactual class type. The vector X includes controls for School, as well as potentially further predetermined variables such as Poor. Since compliance is imperfect, D = Z, this assumption does not allow point-identifying average treatment effects, however. Identified sets under the assumption of instrument exogeneity are discussed in online appendix B. We are also considering identified sets under the additional assumption of monotone treatment response, Y 1 ≥ Y 0 . Identification of potential outcome distributions under this assumption is discussed in Manski (1997) .
The outcome variables Y considered are normalized test scores averaged over third-and fourth-grade tests for math and for reading. The objective functions φ we look at are various quantiles of the outcome distribution f (Y ). Two types of restricted policy sets are studied: policies increasing or decreasing the probability of being assigned to a small class for all students by an equal amount and policies reallocating teachers between nonpoor and poor students, holding the total number of teachers constant. , the "average treatment effects" on φ of class size for the groups of students with and without free lunch, for the two outcome variables and various quantiles φ. 15 These give the estimated effect of reassigning students from regular to small classes for either group on the unconditional outcome distribution. The final two columns give estimated bounds on the implied effect of two further policies: the first moving all students from regular to small classes, and the second moving all poor students from regular to small classes and compensating by moving an equal number of nonpoor students from small to regular classes. Figure 2 conveys the same information graphically, including additional quantiles.
The results reported in table 3 and figure 2 illustrate nicely the dependence of the identified policy ranking on (a) identifying assumptions, (b the objective function, and (c) the set of feasible policies:
1. Assuming only instrument exogeneity, we cannot identify the ranking of policies redistributing teachers. If however, we additionally impose monotone treatment effects, the data become informative about the ranking of redistributive policies. 2. Consider the effect of redistributing resources from nonpoor to poor students under the assumptions of exogeneity and monotonicity. The effect of such a redistribution on lower quantiles of the test score distribution is unambiguously positive. The effect on top quantiles is ambiguous, however. 3. If feasible policies are subject to an aggregate budget constraint, then the ranking in terms of top quantiles is not identified. Policies decreasing class sizes for all 15 We take the sample distribution of test scores as the status quo distribution, based on which to evaluate the effect of changing treatment assignment policies. students equally can be unambiguously ranked, however, even without the assumption of monotonicity.
It is useful to recall how the theoretical developments in previous sections influenced our empirical approach in this section: First, and most important, is our choice of objects of interest. Identified welfare rankings of policies, while arguably of great applied interest, have not been the subject of previous empirical studies to the best of our knowledge.
Second, our application demonstrates the interplay between identifying assumptions, objective functions, and constraints on feasible policies in determining the identifiability of policy rankings. From this vantage point, this section is not so much an application of new methods but rather a specific example illustrating our general argument. We elaborated on this interplay in propositions 1 through 4 for the linear case and generalized these propositions to the nonlinear case in propositions 6 and 7.
Third, we focus on quantiles of test score distributions as our objective functions. Bounds on the (approximate) effect of policies on these quantiles are constructed using the results of proposition 5. As discussed at the end of section IV, for the case of quantiles, the fact that we use a linear approximation does not affect our conclusion regarding policy rankings. This is because the sign of policy effects on quantiles is minus the sign of policy effects on the cumulative distribution function at specific points. The cumulative distribution function is in fact linear in the outcome distribution.
Fourth, we perform inference on supersets of the status quo policy in the following section. The inference procedure used is uniform in the set of policies in the sense that we construct sets such that there is an asymptotic probability of 0.95 that all policies in these sets are contained in the true superset. We developed such inference procedures in section VB. A. Inference Figure 3 shows the results of implementing the inference procedure proposed in section VB. The black rectangles in this figure correspond to the point estimates of G , that is, the point estimates of bounds on conditional quantile treatment effects as displayed in table 3. The larger gray rectangles G 2 correspond to confidence sets, which contain the identified set for g φ with probability 0.95. These pictures do not show sets G 1 contained in the true set with probability 0.95, as our method yields empty sets for these; the bounds are too imprecisely estimated. Note that the confidence sets G 2 are wider than pointwise confidence bands would be, since we require uniform (simultaneous) coverage across all bounds and across poor and nonpoor students (see section VB). Estimates of the covariance matrix of estimated bounds are obtained using the bootstrap. Figure 3 further displays the dual and polar cones of G and G 2 (with respect to the Euclidean inner product). The dual cone of G is the set of all points to the northeast of the black lines. This is the set of policy differences h ab (rescaled by population shares of poor and nonpoor students) for which our point estimates indicate an unambiguously positive effect on the respective quantiles of reading and test scores. Purely redistributive policies, subject to a population budget constraint on teachers, correspond to points on the downward-sloping 45 degree line. Consistent with the estimates in table 3, our point estimates suggest that redistribution to poor students has positive effects on the 0.3 quantiles of reading and math scores, as well as on the 0.5 quantile of math scores, while the effect on the 0.5 quantile of reading scores is ambiguous. The dual cone of G 2 that is the set of points to the northeast of the gray lines, is a set contained in the dual cone of the identified set G with probability 0.95. The probability of any of the policies in this dual cone not resulting in increases of the objective function is 0.05. As can be seen from the graphs, we cannot conclusively reject the possibility that the effect of These figures are analogous to figure 1. The horizontal axis represents treatment effects for poor (free-lunch) students; the vertical axis represents treatment effects for nonpoor students. The black rectangles G depict point estimates for bounds on the conditional effects g φ ; the gray rectangles G2 depict confidence sets containing the true G with probability 0.95. The straight black and gray lines indicate the boundaries of the corresponding dual and polar cones. See the discussion in section VB. redistribution toward poor students is ambiguous. The effect of a decrease in class sizes for some or all students, however, is unambiguously positive and statistically significantly so, no matter which of the quantiles we choose as our objective.
VII. Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to explore the frontier in the tradeoff between the twin goals of recognition of the limits of our knowledge, on the one hand, and the need to give informed policy recommendations, on the other hand. Philosophically speaking, the goal is to reconcile a position of skepticism, which refrains from making strong a priori assumptions, and of pragmatism, which asserts that relevant empirical parameters are those having implications for policy choice. This paper discusses in particular under what conditions and to what extent the welfare ranking of policies is identified. The answer to this question depends on the interaction of the identified set, the feasible policy set, and the objective function. This paper discusses this question in the context of policies allocating a binary treatment based on observable covariates under partial identification of conditional average treatment effects and with possibly restricted sets of feasible policies. General nonlinear objective functions are allowed for.
